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CHAPTER II 
UNDERLYING THEORY  
 
To analyze this research, the writer needs sometheories that will be used in 
analyzing and some definitions of the terms related to this research. This chapter describes 
the notion of pragmatics, aspects of language studied in pragmatics, notion of speech acts, 
classification of speech act, disagreement, and politeness strategies.  
A. Pragmatic 
1. Notion of Pragmatic 
Recently, the study of pragmatic is very important in learning foreign 
language. Pragmatic understanding is much needed by a learner to use foreign 
language in communication. Learning language is not only learning about the 
language but also learning about the culture of the country of language we learned.  
Levinson (1983: 09) states that pragmatics is the study of relations 
between language and context that are relevant to the writing of grammars. Hatch 
(1994: 260) states that pragmatics is the study of what the speaker mean to convey 
when they use language. Pragmatic is also commonly defined as the study of 
particular kinds of meaning, such as ―meaning in context‖ (Thomas, 1995: 1f) and 
―contextual meaning‖ (Yule, 1996: 03). 
Crystal (1997: 301) stated pragmatics is study of language at the point of 
that view of its user, especially of the choices they make, the constraints they 
encounter in using language in social interaction and the effect their use of language 
has on other participant in the act of communication. While Yule (2006) stated that 
pragmatics is the study of invisible meaning, or how we recognize what is meant, 
even when it isn‘t actually said or written. In addition, Huang (2007: 02) defined 
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pragmatics is the systematic study of meaning by virtue of or dependent on the 
language use.  
Pragmatics as a domain of inquiry within second language acquisition is 
usually referred to as Interlanguage Pragmatics. Farina and Suleiman (2009: 112) 
state that in Interlanguage Pragmatic studies, there is still an ongoing debate on the 
relationship between L2 proficiency and L1 transfer of the influence of learners‘ 
native language and culture on their production and comprehension of L2 speech 
act. According to Schauer (2009: 02) Interlangauge Pragmatic is the acquisition, 
comprehension, and production of contextually appropriate language by foreign or 
second language learners. Then, Tinarah (2012: 11) concluded that pragmatics is the 
study of relationship between language and people who used them. She added that it 
is the stage of linguistics dealling with the physical data of speech, meaning, and 
context of the utterances. A scope for pragmatics would include the study of 
implicature, presupposition speech act and deixis. It would include the study of 
principles of language used that could not be shown to have consequence on 
grammar of language and this could be an embarassment.  
Hymes (1974: 53 – 62) concluded there are several factors that are 
considered as context to give contribution to utterance meaning. Hymes named it as 
S-P-E-A-K-I-N-G model. It is a model socio-linguistic study (represented as a 
mnemonic). It is a tool to assist the identification and labeling of components of 
linguistic interaction that was driven by his view, in order to speak language 
correctly, one needs not only to learn its vocabulary and grammar, but also the 
context of which words are used. S-P-E-A-K-I-N-G is an acronym of setting and 




(a) Setting and Scene 
Hymes explains settingrefers to ―when‖ (time) and ―where‖ (place)of a  
speech act and, in general, to the physical situation / circumstances. Scene is the 
―psychological setting‖ or ―cultural definition‖ (position in the society) of a 
scene, including characteriistics such as range of formality and sense of play or 
seriousness. It means different setting and scene influences speaker(s) to use 
different language variants choice and also the expression.  
(b) Participant (s) 
Hymes explains participant(s) as subject(s) who involves in the 
conversation. The participants consist of speaker(s) and hearer(s). 
(c) Act sequence 
Act sequence includes message form and message content. Message form 
is defined as how something is said or the ways of speaking dealing with diction 
in saying something. While message content refers to the topic of what is said.  
(d) Key 
Key is identified as tone or loudness in which utterance is uttered by the 
speaker. The tone, mode, spirit or manner of saying utterance may be leisure, 
serious, satirical, etc. Key may be signalled by nonverbal acts, like winking, 
gesture, posture, the way participants dress up, musical accompaniment and 
even the length in saying vowel signall an emphasis. 
(e) Instrumentalities 
Instrumentalities mean norms and styles of speech. It might be a casual or 





(f) Norms of interaction and Interpretation 
Norms of interaction and interpretation are defined as behaviours attached 
in saying an utterance, like tone of uttering something, silences, space between 
participants while communicating, eye contact, etc. These behaviours are related 
to the culture of certain place.  
(g) Genre   
Genre here means the kind of speech act or event. 
 
2. Aspects of Language Studies on Pragmatics 
Language studies on pragmatics has several aspects as follows: 
a. Presupposition 
According to Peccei (1999: 22), presuppositions are closely linked to the 
words and grammatical that are actually used in the utterance. Whereas, Levinson 
(2000: 179) states that presupposition is relating to an utterance that must be 
known or assumed by the speaker and adressee for the utterance to be considered 
appropriate in context. Anwar (2012: 11) concludes that presupposition focuses 
on the logical meaning at a sentences or meanings associated with or entailed by 
sentences. So, presupposition is an assumption drawn by the hearer to what the 
speaker say.  
 
b. Diexis 
Renkema (1993: 76) defined deixis deals with connection between 
discourse and the situation which discourse is used. Deictic words are words with 
a refference point which is speaker or writer dependent and is decided by the 
speaker‘s or writer‘s position in space and time. Deictic are focused from 
speaker‘s perspective.  
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Further, Levinson (1983: 68) states that at least there are five kinds of 
diexis, namely person, time, place, social, and discourse diexis. 
 
1) Person Diexis 
When somebody tries to use language as a way to point people and 
the words that used are him, her, and them, it is called person diexis (Anwar, 
2012: 12). Actually, person diexis consists of three, they are first person (I), 
second person (you), and third person (he, she, they, him, her, and them). 
 
2) Time / Temporal Diexis 
Temporal diexis focuses on period relative to the time of speaking. 
Of course, in this case, as a way of pointing to time with language, the 
speaker uses certain words that refer to a time such as now, tomorrow, etc.  
 
3) Place Diexis 
Place diexis or spatial diexis is to point a location. The words that 
can be used by the speaker are here, there, etc. It concerns the closed 
relationship between room or space and place of the participants.  
 
4) Social diexis 
According to Fillmore (1975: 76) in Levinson (1983: 89), social 
diexis focuses on the part of sentences which are determined by a certain 
realities of the social condition in which the speech happens. To identify the 








5) Discourse Diexis 
Discourse diexis is usually called as text diexis. It concerns the use 
of expressions within some utterances to point some segments of the 
discourse that contain some utterances.  
Levinson (1995: 12) defined deixis as the ways in which languages 
encode or grammaticalize features of the context of utterances or speech event 
and thus also concerns ways in which the interpretation of utterances depends on 
the analysis of that context of utterances. 
Yule (2006: 115) states that diexis is the use of word as way to point 
something with language, for example this or here. Anwar (2012: 11) insists that 
deixis is a word that takes some components of its meaning based on the context 
of utterance expressed. 
 
c. Speech act 
Speech act has a great influence on the area of pragmatic studies. It 
influences the relationship between form and function of language strongly. In 
speech act, language is seen as a form of acting (Anwar, 2012: 13). For Yule 
(2006: 250) ―Speech act is an action such promising performed by a speaker with 
an utterance, either as a direct speech act or an indirect speech act.‖ 
 
d. Implicature Theory 
The intention of speech is showed by implicature. It is an inference, so 
that it cannot be drawn from utterance by itself. Yule (2006: 116) proposes that 
additional information that used by the listener to create a correlation between 
what is said what must be meant is called inference. Implicatures are indirect 
meaning that the addressee must infer based on the context or situation of the 
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utterance and the knowledge that the addresser and addressee share. For Grice 
(1967) in Levinson (1983: 100) there are two kinds of implicature, namely 
conventional implicature and conversational implicature. 
 
1) Conventional Implicature 
Levinson (1983: 127) proposes that conventional is not truth 
conditional inference which is not taken from super ordinate pragmatic 
principle, but it is simple attached by connecting to particular lexical item or 
expression.  
   For example: 
   Yovan  : What subject does Sania like? 
   Fandi  : She likes English. 
 
    The implicature is informing Yovan that Sania likes English.   
 
2) Conversational Implicature 
Conversational implicature is to get the meaning of the speaker. In this 
case, the hearers or listeners have to infer based on the speech context.  
For example: (Obama‘s wife talks to Obama). 
Obama’s wife  : Would you mind giving your heart to Iraqi? 
Obama   : Sure. 
 
The implicature of the utterance is that Obama‘s wife is requesting his 
husband to stop war in Iraq (Anwar, 2012: 16). 
 
e. Face Threatening Act (Politeness)  
Yule (2006: 119) states that FTA (Face Threatening Act) is something that 
represents a threat to another person‘s self image. For example, if we use a direct 
speech act to get someone to do something such as, ―Give me a book!‖, we are 
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behaving as if we have more social power, if we do not have the social power, 
then we are performing a face threatening act. 
 
B. Speech Act 
1. Notion of Speech Act 
According to Austin (1962), speech act theory is a theory of how utterances 
are used to achieve intentions. Speech act theories attempt to account for how 
language is used by people every day to achieve their goals and intentions.  
…..speech acts create and the same time presuppose relational and other 
aspects of context. There is no unilateral relation of causation or a one-to-one 
correspondence between acts and contexts but rather a flexible relation of 
mutual elaboration. 
   (Streek, 1980: 151 in Kasper (-----: 294) 
Allwood (1977: 01) made a concept of features of relationship between 
action and communication as follows: 
1) The intention and purpose (intended effects) of a communicative action. 
2) The actual overt behavior used to perform the communicative action. 
3) The context in which the communicative action is performed. 
4) The actually achieved effects in a receiver of the act of communication (these 
effects need to be identical with the intended effects). 
Austin (1962) postulates that engaging in a speech act means performing 
the complementary acts of locution, illo-cution and perlocution. 
a) Locutionary act 
A locutionary act is a sentence uttered with a determinate sense and 
reference, an act performed in order to communicate. The study of locutionary 
act is the domain of descriptive linguistics which comprises phonetics, syntax, 
phonology and linguistic semantics. 
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b) Illocutionary act 
An illocutionary act is a non-linguistic act performed through a 
linguistic or locutionary act. Illocutionary acts include commanding, daring, 
nominating,resigning, etc., and can be affected through performative sentences, 
whether or not they contain performative verbs (Fromklin and Rod-man, 1983). 
For instance, "it is raining" is an implicit performance of 'stating' even when the 
sentence contains no performative verb (Lawal et al, 1996: 639). 
c) Perlocutionary act  
A perlocutionary act results from a language user's utterance (Lawal et 
al, 1996: 640) and, according to Levinson (1980), it is the intended or 
unintended consequence of, or reaction to what is said. This act is not part of the 
conventional meaning of the utterance, but it is derived from the context and 
situation of the utterance. This implies that interpreting utterances is more than 
just recognising the speaker's intention by following the convention of verbal 
communication (Lawal et al, 1996: 640). 
Austin (1962: 101) in Allwood (1977: 01) writes: 
‗Saying something will often, or even normally, produce certain 
consequential effects upon the feelings, thoughts or actions of other 
persons: and it may be done with the design, intention or purpose of 
producing them; …. We shall call the performance of an act of this 
kind the performance of a perlocutionary act or perlocution.’ 
 
2. Types of Speech Act 
Searle (1976: 10 – 16) gives five categories of speech acts namely: 
a. Representatives: here the speaker asserts a preposition to be true, using such 
verbs as: affirm, believe, conclude, deny, and report. 
b. Directives: here the speaker tries to make the hearer do something, with such 
words as: ask, beg, challenge, command, dare, invite, insist, and request. 
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c. Commissives: here the speaker commits himself (or herself) to a (future) course 
of action, with verbs such as: guarantee, pledge, promise, swear, vow, 
undertake, and warrant. 
d. Expressives: the speaker expresses an attitude to or about a state of affairs, using 
such verbs as: apologize, appreciate, congratulate, deplore, detest, regret, thank, 
disagreement and welcome.  
e. Declarations: the speaker alters the external status or condition of an object or 
situation, solely by making the utterance: I now pronounce you man and wife, I 
sentence you to be hanged by the neck until you be dead, I name this ship…, 
etc.  
 
C. Disagreement  
Kakava (2002: 1537) investigates that disagreement is a dispreferred action. 
Koczogh choose her own thought about disagreement. She focuses on verbal 
disagreement as her study. According to Koczogh (2012: 01) verbal disagreement is a 
speech act expressing speaker‘s opinion or belief whose propositional content or 
illocutionary force is partly or fully inconsistent with that of the previous speaker‘s 
utterance. Argumentation is a social, intellectual, verbal activity serving to justify or 
refuse an opinion, consisiting of a constellation of utterances which have a justifying or 
refuting function and being directed towards obtaining the agreement of a judge who is 
deemed to be reasonable (Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1982: 1). Eemeren et al propose 
the need of argumentation arises when language users disagree as to the accpetability of 
a given opinion and wish to resolve a subsequent conflict of opinion by verbal means. 
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In early politeness theories, disagreement is mostly seen as a dispreferred, 
face-threatening act that poses a threat to the addressee‘s positive aspect of face, and thus 
may jeopardize the social harmony between hearer and speaker (Koczogh, 2012: 01). 
 
1. Hierarchy of Disagreement 
Graham (2008) in offers the following Disagreement Hierarchy (DH). 
a. DH0. Name Calling 
This is the lowest form of disagreement, and probably also the most 
common.We have all seen comments like this: u r a fag!!! But it is important to 
realize that more articulate name-calling has just as little weight. A comment 
like the author is a self-important dilettante. It is really nothing more than a 
pretentious version of "u r a fag." 
 
b. DH1. Ad Hominem 
An ad hominem attack is not quite as weak as mere name-calling. It 
might actually carry some weight. For example, if a senator wrote an article 
saying senators' salaries should be increased, one could respond: Of course he 
would say that. He's a senator.  
This wouldn't refute the author's argument, but it may at least be relevant 
to the case. It's still a very weak form of disagreement, though. If there's 
something wrong with the senator's argument, you should say what it is; and if 
there isn't, what difference does it make that he's a senator? 
Saying that an author lacks the authority to write about a topic is a variant 
of ad hominem—and a particularly useless sort, because good ideas often come 
from outsiders. The question is whether the author is correct or not. If his lack 
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of authority caused him to make mistakes, point those out. And if it didn't, it's 
not a problem. 
 
c. DH2. Responding to Tone 
The next level up we start to see responses to the writing, rather than the 
writer. The lowest form of these is to disagree with the author's tone. E.g. I can't 
believe the author dismisses intelligent design in such a cavalier fashion.  
Though better than attacking the author, this is still a weak form of 
disagreement. It matters much more whether the author is wrong or right than 
what his tone is. Especially since tone is so hard to judge. Someone who has a 
chip on their shoulder about some topic might be offended by a tone that to 
other readers seemed neutral. 
So if the worst thing you can say about something is to criticize its tone, 
you're not saying much. Is the author flippant, but correct? Better that than 
grave and wrong. And if the author is incorrect somewhere, say where. 
 
d. DH3. Contradiction 
In this stage we finally get responses to what was said, rather than how or 
by whom. The lowest form of response to an argument is simply to state the 
opposing case, with little or no supporting evidence.This is often combined with 
DH2 statements, as in: I can't believe the author dismisses intelligent design in 
such a cavalier fashion. Intelligent design is a legitimate scientific theory.  
Contradiction can sometimes have some weight. Sometimes merely 
seeing the opposing case stated explicitly is enough to see that it's right. But 




e. DH4. Counterargument 
At level 4 we reach the first form of convincing disagreement: 
counterargument. Forms up to this point can usually be ignored as proving 
nothing. Counterargument might prove something. The problem is, it's hard to 
say exactly what. 
Counterargument is contradiction plus reasoning and/or evidence. When 
aimed squarely at the original argument, it can be convincing. But unfortunately 
it's common for counterarguments to be aimed at something slightly different. 
More often than not, two people arguing passionately about something are 
actually arguing about two different things. Sometimes they even agree with one 
another, but are so caught up in their squabble they don't realize it. 
There could be a legitimate reason for arguing against something slightly 
different from what the original author said: when you feel they missed the heart 
of the matter. But when you do that, you should say explicitly you're doing it. 
 
f. DH5. Refutation 
The most convincing form of disagreement is refutation. It's also the 
rarest, because it's the most work. Indeed, the disagreement hierarchy forms a 
kind of pyramid, in the sense that the higher you go the fewer instances you 
find. 
To refute someone you probably have to quote them. You have to find a 
"smoking gun," a passage in whatever you disagree with that you feel is 
mistaken, and then explain why it's mistaken. If you can't find an actual quote to 
disagree with, you may be arguing with a straw man. 
While refutation generally entails quoting, quoting doesn't necessarily 
imply refutation. Some writers quote parts of things they disagree with to give 
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the appearance of legitimate refutation, then follow with a response as low as 
DH3 or even DH0. 
 
g. DH6. Refuting the Central Point 
The force of a refutation depends on what you refute. The most powerful 
form of disagreement is to refute someone's central point.Even as high as DH5 
we still sometimes see deliberate dishonesty, as when someone picks out minor 
points of an argument and refutes those. Sometimes the spirit in which this is 
done makes it more of a sophisticated form of ad hominem than actual 
refutation. For example, correcting someone's grammar, or harping on minor 
mistakes in names or numbers. Unless the opposing argument actually depends 
on such things, the only purpose of correcting them is to discredit one's 
opponent. 
Truly refuting something requires one to refute its central point, or at 
least one of them. And that means one has to commit explicitly to what the 
central point is. So a truly effective refutation would look like:  
The author's main point seems to be x. As he says:  
<quotation> 
But this is wrong for the following reasons...  
The quotation you point out as mistaken need not be the actual statement 








h. DH7. Make the Argument Better, and then Refute Its Central Point 
This highest level was added by Black Belt Bayesian. He writes: ―When 
an argument is made, you learn about that argument. But often you also learn 
about arguments that could have been made, but weren‘t. Sometimes those 
arguments work where the original argument doesn‘t. If you‘re interested in 
being on the right side of disputes, you will refute your opponents‘ arguments. 
But if you‘re interested in producing truth, you will fix your opponents‘ 
arguments for them. To win, you must fight not only the creature you encounter; 
you must fight the most horrible thing that can be constructed from its corpse.‖ 












Picture 1: Hierarchy of Disagreement by Paul Graham 
Graham Concludes: 
The greatest benefit of disagreeing well is not just that it will make 
conversations better, but that it will make the people who have them happier. If you 
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study conversations, you find there is a lot more meanness down in DH1 than up in 
DH6. You don‘t have to be mean when you have a real point to make. In fact, you 
don‘t want to. If you have something real to say, being mean just gets in the way. 
If moving up the disagreement hierarchy makes people less mean, that will 
make most of them happier. Most people don‘t really enjoy being mean; they do it 
because they can‘t help it. 
 
2. Previous Studies in Disagreement 
Miller (2000) from Marietta College conducted the research entitled 
Power, Severity, and Context in Disagreement. This study examines the act of 
disagreement as realized in university settings and the choice of linguistic markers 
used to soften or strengthen disagreement. She concluded that severity of 
disagreement could have two opposite results: in one, politeness was increased to 
lessen face threat to the addressee; in the other, face threat to the speaker outweighed 
considerations of the addressees‘ face; leading to aggravated disagreement. Face 
maintenance concerns, however, do not account for how disagreement was used to 
serve pedagogical aims, specifically when disagreement was used as a part of the 
elicitation sequence.   
The second study is by Kangasharju (2002) from Finland who carried out 
a study entitled Alignment in Disagreement: Forming Oppositional alliances in 
committee meetings. She investigated an alignment of two or more participants into 
team in the course of a disagreement which is a sequential phenomenon that can 
only occur in multiperson interaction. Kangasharju states that a disagreement 
between participants is collective. The collectivities producing counter-arguments in 
concert are here called oppositional alliances. An oppositional alliance is one 
23 
 
example of the potential subgroups in multi person setting. He discussed some 
examples demonstrating how alliances are formed in disagreement. He focuses on 
the sequential organization of the alliances and the tasks they accomplish in 
institutional committee meeting.   
Then, Jacobs (2002) conducted the research entitled Maintaining 
Neutrality in dispute mediation: managing disagreement while managing to 
disagree. He thinks that mediators are very important to manage multiple competing 
demands. He shows three tactics mediators that is indirect advocacy, framing of 
advocacy, and equivocal of advocacy. These tactics serve as functional substitutes 
for more simple and straightforward moves of disagreement. 
The fourth study is from Habib (2008): Humor and Disagreement: 
Identity Construction and Cross Cultural Enrichment. She found teasing and 
disagreement as educational tools rather than conflict indicators and the 
implementation of these tools to maintain a strong relationship, raise culture 
awareness, and gain knowledge of the world. The data show that teasing and 
disagreement can be used jointly not only to establish relational identity display and 
development but also to reaffirm a preexisting one and to elaborate on topics that 
lead to scope expansion and acquisition of new notions that have not been 
encountered previously.  
The later research is conducted by Sofwan and Suwignyo (2011) entitled 
The Realization of Disagreement Strategies by Non-Native Speakers of English. This 
study aims to investigate the realization of disagreement strategies by non-native 
speakers of English by eliciting data through DCT and role plays for two groups: 
first year students and third year students. The result showed that most students 
realized disagreement through contradiction, counterclaim, irrelevancy claim, 
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contradiction and counterclaim, and challenges related to personal involvement and 
non-personal involvement issues in different social status. The contradiction strategy 
was dominantly used by the students. The findings showed that there is no pragmatic 
development from first year students to third year students. The correspondents 
produced the disagreement strategy in the same way although they have different 
proficiency level.   
Ginvestigate the ways power relations influence politeness strategies in 
disagreement. He used DCT (Discourse Completion Task) method which consists of 
five scenarios in which the subjects are expected to disagree with two higher 
statuses, two with peers, and one with a lower status. The findings of this study find 
the relation between people with different power status and the strategies in 
disagreement.  
Izadi (2012) conducted a research entitled Strategies used to Mitigate 
Disagreement in English as Foreign Language among Iranians. The study 
investigates the linguistic markers which are common in mitigating the speech act of 
disagreement in the context of academic discourse. The study described and 
exemplified the most frequent strategies highly-proficient Iranian English users 
employ to mitigate their disagreement. The result showed that ‗partial agreement‘ 
and ‗positive comments‘ were the two most frequent strategies.  
Finally, Koczogh in her dissertation (2012) entitled The Effect of Gender 
and Social Distance on the Expression of Verbal Disagreement Employed by 
Hungarian Undergraduates Students investigates disagreement, more precisely, 
verbal disagreement expressed by undergraduate students at the University of 
Debrecen from a sociopragmatic point of view. The majority of the research carried 
out on disagreement has focused on the English language, surveying the effects of 
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power, and Degree of imposition on the expression of disagreement. The aims of 
this dissertation are 1) to examine verbal disagreement as it is accomplished 
linguistically in the conversations of Hungarian undergraduate students, 2) to map 
the functional spectrum of disagreements occurring in the data, and 3) to determine 
the effects of the variables of gender and social distance on the expression of verbal 
disagreement.     
 
3. Politeness 
a. Notion of Politeness 
The fundamental theory of politeness was built by Brown and 
Levinson in 1978. The names of Brown and Levinson have become almost 
identical with the word politeness itself as it is impossible to talk about 
politeness without referring to them. Brown and Levinson illustrated the term of 
―politeness‖ by using the notion of ―face‖. Kitamura (2000: 1) explains the 
work of Brown and Levinson‘s theory of ―face‖ as all interact ants have an 
interest in maintaining two types of ―face‖ during interaction: ―positive face‖ 
and ―negative face‖. Brown and Levinson define ‗positive face‘ as the positive 
and consistent image people have of themselves, and their desire for approval. 
On the other hand, ‗negative face‘ is ―the basic claim to territories, personal 
preserves, and rights to non-distraction (1978: 61 in Kitamura (2000: 1)‖ 
As Kitamura summarizes (2000: 1): 
….‗positive politeness‘ is expressed by satisfying ‗positive face‘ in two ways: 
1) by indicating similarities amongst interactants; or 2) by expressing an 
appreciation of the interlocutor‘s self image. ―Negative politeness‖ can also 
be expressed in two ways: 1) by saving the interlocutor‘s ‗face‘ (either 
‗negative‘ or ‗positive‘) by mitigating face threatening act, such as advice-
giving and disapproval; 2) by satisfying ‗negative face‘ by indicating respect 




Brown and Levinson (1987: 5) in Fauziati (2009: 201) said that 
politeness principles are principled reasons for deviation from the Cooperative 
Principle (CP) when communication is about to threaten face. They see 
politeness in terms of conflict avoidance with the central themes are rationality 
and face. Face refers to an individual‘s feeling of self-worth or self-image, 
reputation or good names that every one has and expects every one else to 
recognise. Such self-image can be damaged, maintenaed or enhanced through 
interaction with others (Fauziati, 2009: 202).  
According to Hickey (267), politeness is seen in terms of sets of 
strategies on the part of discourse participants for mitigating speech acts which 
are potentially threatening to their own ―face‖ or that of an interlocutor. Hickey 
adds that face should be protected in interaction or communication.  
In short, ‗politeness‘ is used not only to minimize FTAs, but also to 
save or maintain the interaction and interactans‘ face regardless of whether there 
is FTA or not. Meanwhile, Yin (2009) makes a conclusion that politeness is 
what people of different cultural backgrounds all try to observe and maintain. 
Then, Huang (2008: 96) concluded that positive politeness refers to the want of 
every member that his wants be desireble to at least some others whereas 
negative politeness refers to the want of every ‗competent adult member‘ [of a 
society] that his actions be unimpeded by others.  
In English, polite language may be characterized by the use of indirect 
speech, the use of respectful forms of address system like, Sir, Madam, or the 
use of formulaic utterances like, please, excuse me, sorry, thank you, etc 
(Fauziati, 2009: 193). Fauziati (2009) adds that politeness has occupied a central 
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place in the social study of language; even it has been the subject of intensive 
debate in sociolinguistics and pragmatics.  
Politeness can be, thus, conceived of as a matter of social adequacy. 
Polite is the word we use to refer to a (linguistic) behaviour conforming to a 
given set of cultural norms: this is its central meaning; strategic uses of 
language should be parasitic on it (Vidal, 1998: 47). According to Yin (2009: 
154) Politeness, as a universal phenomenon in society, is a reflection of specific 
cultural values, which can be observed in all languages and cultures.  
Usami (2001a, 2002a) in Usami (2006: 20) differentiate politeness into 
two concepts that is normative and pragmatic politeness. She argues that 
normative politeness refers to the traditional understanding of the degree of 
politeness intrinsic to linguistic expressions. Meanwhile, pragmatic politeness is 
defined as the function of language manipulation that work to maintain smooth 
human relationships. Usami (2006: 21) offered politeness theory is as discourse 
politeness (DP) theory. Usami introduced the concept of DP to the sentence-
level politeness of linguistic forms based on the opinion that discourse-level 
phenomenon play an important role in pragmatic politeness. Usami defined DP 
as follows:    
―….the functional dynamic whole of factors of both linguistic forms and 
discourse-level phenomenon that play a part in the pragmatic politeness of a 
discourse. Basically, DP can be used in two ways. Its first use is when 
referring to pragmatic politeness that can only be interpreted at the discourse 
level. However, DP is also used to refer to DP Default of a certain discourse, 
which is understood to be the dynamic whole of the elements functioning for 
the pragmatic politeness of what particular discourse. 
(Usami, 2006d: 22) 
 
Usami formulated a new concept of politeness which is contrasted with 
marked politeness of Brown and Levinson. The theory is known as unmarked 
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politeness. She encompasses Brown and Levinson‘s notion of politeness as 
linguistic strategies for redressing the Face Threats. In general, politeness theory 
should systematically address both marked and unmarked politeness within a 
single framework, rather than merely focus on marked politeness, as is the case 
in B&L‘s politeness theory (Usami, 2006: 24) 
 
b. Politeness Strategies 
Politeness strategies are developed to save the hearer‘s face. Politeness 
strategies are involved in redressing these face-threats. They are aimed at 
supporting or enhancing the addressee‘s positive face (positive politeness) and 
avoiding transgression of the addressee‘s freedom of action and freedom 
imposition (negative politeness) (Fauziati, 2009: 202). In the case of Face 
Threatening Act (FTAs), something is needed which will reduce the violation of 
face to a minimum and preserve stability as much as possible. Brown and 
Levinson (1978) in Renkema (1992: 14) propose that there are four strategies in 
politeness. They are bald on record, (without repressive action), positive 
politeness, and off record.  
 
1) Say thing as it is (Bald on Record) 
The Bald-On-Record strategy does nothing to minimize threats to the 
hearer‘s ―face‖. This strategy provides no effort by the speaker to minimize 
threats to the other‘s face. The statement is directly addressed to the other as 
a means of expressing our needs. The speaker will most likely shock the 
person to whom he is speaking to. This form is usually found with people 
who know each other well and they have a closed relationship, such as in 
 ―I want some a ballpoint!‖  
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This is also often used in emergency situations, regardless of who is 
being addressed, such as in: 
―Don‘t open the door!‖ 
There are two types of Bald on Record, cases of Non –Minimization of 
the face threat and cases of FTA – bald on record usage. 
a) Case of Non – minimization of the Face Threat 
It is used usually in urgency situation, such as: 
(a.1) imperative urgency, ex: whatch out! Get up 
(a.2) entreaties, ex: excuse me. Don‘t forget us. 
(a.3) on the telephone in bald connection, ex: come home right now! 
b) Cases of FTA – oriented blad on record usage 
Here there are three areas where one would  expect some pre-
empetive invitatitions, they are: 
(b.1) welcoming (or post greeting), ex: Come, Come Again 
(b.2) Farewell, ex: i am staying, you go. 
(b.3) Offers, ex: have you some more cake. Sit down. 
 
2) Positive politeness 
The positive politeness strategy shows you recognize that your hearer 
has a desire to be respected. It also confirms that the relationship is friendly 
and expresses group reciprocity. Positive politeness orients to preserve the 
positive face of other people. In positive politeness strategy, the speaker 
knows well that the hearer has desire to be respected. It minimizes threats to 
the positive face, such as self image (Anwar, 2012: 21). It is concerned with 
the person‘s positive face that tends to show solidarity and emphasize that 
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both speakers want to something and that they have a general aim. For 
example: ―Hey friend, could you lend me a ballpoint?‖ 
According to Brown and Levinson (1987: 103 – 129) there are fifteen 
strategies of positive politeness strategies namely: 
a) Positive Politeness 1 (PP 1): Notice, attend to Hearer (His interests, 
wants, needs, goods) . 
Generally, this output suggests that Speaker should take notice of 
aspects of hearer‘s conditions. 
Example : ―Jim, you are really good at solving computer problem.‖ 
FTA: I wonder if you could just help me with a little formating problem 
I‘ve got.  
b) Positive Politeness 2 (PP 2): Exaggerate (Interest, approval, sympathy 
with hearer) 
This often done with exaggerate intonation, stress, and other 
aspects of prosodic.  
Example : ―Good old Jim. Just the man I wanted to see. I knew I‘d find 
you here‖ 
FTA: Could you spare me a couple of minutes 
c) Positive Politeness 3 (PP 3): Intensify interest to Hearer in the speaker 
contribution.  
Brown and Levinson (1987: 106) stated that sharing of some 
speaker‘s wants is to intensify the interest of his own contribution, by 
―making a good story‖ and draw hearer as a participant into the 




Example : “I come down the street, and what do you think I see? – a 
huge mess all over the place, ........” 
FTA: Begins with a narrative or a good story.  
d) Positive Politeness 4 (PP 4): Use in – group identity makers in speech. 
Using any of the innumerable ways to convey in – group 
membership: adress forms, language of dialect, jargon or slang and 
ellipses. 
Example : ―Here‘s my old mate Fred. How are you today, mate ‖ 
FTA: Could you use a hand to get this car start? 
e) Positive Politeness 5 (PP 5): Seek agreement. 
Two types of seek agreement are safe topics and repetition. 
Speaker can stress his agreement with hearer and satisfy hearer‘s desire 
to be ―right‖ in his opinions by safe topics. Repeating can be used to 
stress emotional agreement with the utterance (or to stress interest or 
surprise. Speaker seeks ways in which it is possible to agree with hearer. 
Example : ―I agree, right, Manchester United played really badly last 
night, didn‘t they? ‖ 
f) Positive Politeness 6 (PP 6): Avoid disagreement 
Avoiding disagreement consists of four types: they are token 
agreement, pseudo agreement, white lies and hedging opinions. It is the 
desire to agree or appear to agree with hearer leads also to mechanisms 
for pretending to agree. Pseudo agreement is marked by then as a 
conclusory marker, an indication that speaker is drawing a conclusion to 
aline reasoning carried out cooperatively with the adressee. White lies, 
where speaker, when confronted, with the necessity to state an opinion, 
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wants to lie rather than damage Hearer‘s positive face. In hedging 
opinions, speaker may choose to be vague about his own opinions, so as 
not to be seen to disagree (Brown and Levinson, 1987: 113). 
Example :  
A : Can you hear me? 
B ; Barely (token agreement) 
I’ll meet you in front of the theater just before 08.00 then. (pesudo 
agreement) 
He wants to borrow speaker’s radio. 
S ; Oh, I can’t. The batteries are dead. (white lies) 
It’s really beautiful in a way.(hedging opinions) 
FTA: Why don‘t you ..... ? 
g) Positive Politeness 7 (PP 7): Presuppose / raise / assert common ground. 
 There are eleven types of PP 7, they are gossip or small talk, point 
of vies operations, personal centre switch, time switch, place switch, 
avoidance of adjustment of reports to hearer‘s point of view, 
presupposition manipulations, presuppose knowledge of hearer‘s wants 
and attitudes, presuppose hearer‘s values are the same as speaker‘s 
value, presuppose familiarity in speaker hearer relationship, presuppose 
hearer‘s knowledge (Brown and Levinson: 1987: 117).The value of 
speaker‘s spending time and effort on being with hearer, as a mark of 
friendship or interest in him, by talking for a while about unrelated 
topics. 
Example : ―People like me and you. bill, don‘t like being pushed around 
like that, do we?‖ 
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FTA: Why don‘t you go and complain? 
h) Positive Politeness 8 (PP 8): Joke 
Jokes are based on mutual shared background and values and 
putting hearer ―at ease‖. Jokes may be used to stress that shared 
background or those shared values (Brown and Levinson, 1987: 124). 
Example :  
A : Great summer we‘re having. It‘s only rained five times a week on 
average.  
B : Yeah, terrible, isn‘t it? 
A : (FTA): Could I ask you for a favor? 
i) Assert of presuppose speaker‘s knowledge of and concern for hearer‘s 
wants. 
Assert or imply knowledge of hearer‘s wants and willingness to fit 
one‘s own wants in with them. 
Example : ― I know you like mashmallows, so I‘ve bought you home a 
whole box of them. 
FTA : I wonder if I could ask you for a favor .............. 
j) Offer and Promise 
Example : ― I‘ll take you out to dinner on Saturday.‖ 
FTA : if you‘ll cook the dinner this evening. 
k) Be optimistic 
Speaker assumes that hearer wants for speaker or for hearer and 
speaker, and will help him to obtain them. The FTA is slight. 




FTA : so, I were you, I wouldn‘t cut you lawn back to short.  
l) Include both speaker and hearer in the activity 
Example : ―I‘m feeling really hungry. Let‘s stop for a bite.‖ 
FTA : S  wants to stop and have something to eat and wants to get H to 
agree to do this. 
m) Give (or ask) reaseons 
Example : ―I think you‘ve had a bit too much to drink, Jim.‖ 
FTA: Why not stay at our place this evening? 
n) Assume or assert reciprocity 
Speaker and hearer may claimed or urged by giving evidence of 
reciprocal rights or obligation obtaining between speaker and hearer. 
Example : ―Dad, (FTA : if you help me with my maths homework) I‘ll 
mow the lawn after school tomorrow.)‖ 
o) Give gifts to Hearer (goods, sympathy, understanding, and cooporation) 
Speaker may satisfy hearer‘s positive – face want by actually 
satisfying some of hearer‘s wants (action of gift-giving, not only 
tangible). 
Example : A : Have a glass of malt whisky, Dick. 
    B : Terrific! Thanks. 
 A : Not at all. (FTA : I wonder if I could confide in you for a 
minute or two). 









3) Negative Politeness  
Negative politeness orients to preserve the negative face of other 
people. The Negative Politeness Srategy also reconizes the herarer‘s face. 
The speaker knows well that the addressee wants to be respected. However, 
the speaker is assumed that in the equal way the speaker may be improving 
on the listeners. Negative politeness strategy protects the politeness face. It is 
oriented to the person‘s negative face that tends to show difference and it 
concludes an apology for the imposition or interaction. In addition, there are 
ten strategies addressed to the hearer‘s negative face and are thus examples 
of negative politeness:  
a) Be conventionally indirect: Could you tell me the time please? 
b) Do not assume willingness to comply, question, hedge (Hedging): I 
wonder whether I could just sort of ask you a little question. 
c) Be pessimistic about ability or willingness to comply: Use the 
subjunctive: if you had a little time to spare for me this afternoon, I‘d 
like to talk about my paper. 
d) Minimize the imposition: Could I talk to you for just a minute? 
e) Give deference: (to a police constable) Excuse me, officer, I think I 
might have parked in the wrong place.  
f) Apologize. E.g.Sorry to bother you, but ........ 
g) Impersonalise the speaker and the hearer. Avoid the pronouns I and 
you:  
A : That car‘s parked in a no-parking area. 
B : It‘s mine, officer. 
A : Well, it‘ll have to have a parking ticket.  
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h) State the FTA as an instance of a general rule: 
Parking on the double yellow lines is illegal, so FTA: I‘m going to 
have to give you a fine. 
i) Nominalise to distance the actor and add formality: Participation in an 
illegal demonstration is punishable by law.  FTA: Could I have your 
name and address, madam? 
j) Go on record as incurring a debt, or as not indebting Hearer:  (FTA: 
If you could just sort out a problem I‘ve got with my formatting.) I‘ll 
buy you a beer at lunchtime.  
(Brown and Levinson, 1992: 106 – 227 in Fauziati, 2009: 208 – 209) 
 
4) Off Record 
Off Record Strategy takes some the pressure off of you. You are trying 
to avoid the direct FTA of asking for a beer. Instead you would rather it be 
offered to you once your hearer sees that you want one. The major goal of 
this strategy is to take several of the pressure off the speaker. The speaker is 
taking away himself from any imposing what so ever. This strategy is 
indirectly addressed to the other. The other can work as if the statements 
have ever been heard. This strategy as if statement may or may be not 
succeed, but if it does, it will be because it has been communicated than was 
said. For example: ―Oh no, I forgot to bring my ballpoint today.‖ 
Finally, there are fifteen off record strategies, three addressed to 
Grice‘s Maxim of Relation, three of the Maxim of Quantity, four to the 
Maxim of Quality, and five to the maxim of manner. What follows are the 
examples of off-record sub-strategies: 
Three sub strategies addressed to Grice‘s Maxim of relation: 
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a) Give hints. It‘s cold in here (c.i. Shut the window) 
b) Give association clues. Are you going to market tomorrow? ... There‘s a 
market. Tomorrow, I suppose. (c.i. Give me a ride here) 
c) Presuppose: I wash the car again. (He presupposes that he has done it 
before). 
Three sub strategies addressed to Grice‘s maxim of Quantity.  
d) Understate: That‘s house needs a touch of paint. (about a peeling slum, ‗a 
lot of work) 
e) Overstate: There were a million people in the Co-op tonight!  
f) Use tautologies: war is war. Boys will be boys. 
Four sub strategies addressed to Grice‘s Maxim of Quality. 
g) Use contradiction: 
A : Are you upset about that? 
B : Well, yes and no. 
h) Be ironic: John‘s a real genius. (after John has just done twenty stupid 
things in a row) 
i) Use metaphors: John‘s a real fish. c.i. He (drinks, swims, is slimy, or is 
cold-blooded) like a fish. 
j) Use rethorical questions: How many times do I have to tell you...? (c.i. 
too many) 
Five sub strategies addressed to Grice‘s Maxim of Manner. 
k) Be ambiguous: John‘s a pretty (sharp pr smooth) cooki 
l) Be vague: Looks like someone may have had too much to drink (vague 
understatement) 
m) Over-generalize: The lawn has got to be mown. 
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n) Displace Hearer: Speaker may go off record as to who the target for his 
FTA is, or he may pretend to address the FTA to someone whom it 
wouldn‘t threaten, and hope that the real target will see that the FTA is 
aimed at him. 
o) Be incomplete, use ellipsis: Well, if one leaves one‘s tea on the wobbly 
table .... 
(Brown and Levinson, 1992: 106 – 227 in Fauziati, 2009: 209 – 210) 
 
5) Remain Silent / Say Nothing / Do Not Perform FTA 
There are times when something is potentially so face threatening that 
we do not say it. The speaker decides to say nothing and genuinely wishes to 
let the matter remain closed and still wishes to achieve the effect that the 
speech act would have achieved had it been uttered. There are two types of 
saying nothing or opting out choice (OOC): 
- OOC-genuine: Speaker does not perform a speech act, and genuinely 
intends to let the matter remain closed. 
- OOC-Strategic: Speaker does not perform a speech act, but expects A to 
infer his wish to achieve the perlocutionary effect (Fauziati, 2009: 205). 
 
